隔牆有耳
記者拿起本新鴻基地產（016）年報，第一時間就是查探究竟哪位董事的人工最高，果然是香港人特色。
年報其實容許自由發揮的空間非常多，肯花心思的，可以把本應枯燥乏味的例行公事變成傳世大作。只怪香港上市公司把一年一次的發表機會視為交差，求其敷衍了事，令人提不起興趣翻閱。以陰謀論看，相信這亦都是某些其身不正的二三線公司管理層之最終目的。
以後的年報都會列出每位董事的薪酬，傳媒會有大量寫作題材。如果我是記者，我會翻多幾頁新地的年報，當中不乏李八方有興趣的花邊新聞。
就以樓盤命名為例，這是地產商大展創意的最佳途徑。凱旋門這名字過去讓人談上近半年，手上其他樓盤將不會用「門」字命名，而會排禮頓山的「山」字輩。例如皇府山。皇府山在哪裏？在上水。又例如曼克頓山。曼克頓山又是在什麽地方？在荔枝角。新地充分展現中國人改名的智慧，除了反映命名者的主觀願望投射，更賦予使用者一份莫名的價值及使命。就好像錢鍾書老竇幫他起這個名字，就真的令他終生與書本為伍。
新地手上還有其他並非一流地段的地盤，但相信將來的名字必定漂亮可人。例如深水埗順寧道╱保安道，可以改名為順安山（如果不嫌cheap太似順安邨）；沙田地段可以考慮沿用前身的稱號（以前叫道風山）。這「山」字輩，長改長有。
命名之外，可以看看地契年份。因歷史關係，大部分地租都是2047年期滿，新地有一批地契例外。例如銅鑼灣世貿中心，地契到期是2842年，你冇眼花，是八百年後。未算厲害，曉峰閣2884年到期；帝景園更勁，是2886年。以新地的用料，帝景園隨時可以捱上八百年，成為屆時香港政府要竭力保護的歷史古蹟。
最後，可以看看購股權。部分董事手上有一批2005年情人節到期的購股權，行使價七十元。新地在2004年尾曾升至近八十元，2005年2月仍在七十元樓上，但這些董事仍然選擇任由購股權到期，拒絕行使，證明連新地董事都認為公司未值七十元。
如果記者肯多做功課，認真地將年報多揭幾頁，那些政治財經花邊新聞就毌須次次熟口熟面。
13 comments:
方兄，抱歉，「皇」不住「府」，而住「宮」；反之住「府」的是「王」。過往《信報》文化版亦曾提及，不贅。但想深一層，此乃浮誇的玩意，實不必太深究。
「凱旋門」亦應在巴黎而非香港﹗
凱旋門 is a sauna place
以「稱號溢價」來說，順安山及道風山樓盤尺價比庇華利山至少低二千元 - 唔少人買豪宅花不少錢在「稱號溢價」上。
信不信尤你， 一九九六年， 一位瑞典籍的經濟學家指出， 若人們在購買或消費前， 理性又客觀地對產品 / 服務進行分析， 決定也是基於真正的需要 (Needs) 而非慾望 (Desire)， 那時候的經濟必定會崩潰下來。
大家又可會希望看見這悲劇嗎？
People in general is superficial...that's why the way of marketing is very important nowsday!
說得好！
既是如此， 人群為何不擦亮眼睛， 莫教 "Marketing" 幌子繼續為害社會呢？
說不得！ 說不得！
我們需要幌子， 才可把反智的群眾騙個光。
如此汰弱留強， 社會才能進步喔！
A world without audits
International Herald Tribune
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2005
Balance Sheet
My column of Sept. 10 left hanging a question that a reader quite rightly thought I should take off the hook.
I had suggested a survival strategy for the Big Four accounting firms, who face extinction because the regulatory requirement to perform standard audits exposes the firms to potentially ruinous levels of liability.
The strategy I suggested was this: Since the standard auditor's report is an endangered, and endangering, species - under the current securities laws, at least - the Big Four firms could control the evolution to a new model by declaring their joint withdrawal from that business.
The reader accepted my assumption that the status quo was not an option and that new forms of assurance must emerge. The question he pressed was about regulatory agencies, like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: In a world without audits, what role, if any, should regulators play?
The tempting, and cynical, response is that the SEC and its counterparts in other countries will always be with us. Even after a regulatory agency has outlived its utility, bureaucracy is like an infestation of kudzu or Australian rabbits: easy to complain about, hard to kill.
But the question deserves serious treatment, since corporate virtue has hardly become widespread in the four years since Enron. Examples of misadventure from this autumn alone include the global bookkeeping issues that delayed the 2004 report of Interpublic, and the arrests of auditors in Tokyo over issues of controls and window-dressing at Kanebo.
Space constraints do not permit a debate at this time over whether regulators can supplant the auditor's report as a source of pre-investment comfort. For now, let's focus on the back end: the investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing. The disappearance of the auditor's report should not change the obligation of companies not to violate the law, but an evolving system that nurtures new forms of corporate assurance could take a blank-page approach to the related law enforcement.
There could be an entirely new tribunal, authorized to hear all disputes relating to financial information issued by public companies - from regulatory enforcement to criminal manipulations to shareholder damages cases.
Presiding over such a body, which might not even be called a court, would be experts, who might not be judges. These experts would concentrate full-time on accounting, reporting and auditing issues, building expertise beyond that of either lay juries or knowledgeable jurists.
Standards of liability could be based upon good published practices, instead of being tied to impractical ideals. Instead of costly courtroom duels between the hindsight arguments of highly priced experts, there would be a safe harbor defense: Absent a finding of actual corruption, companies could not be held liable if they acted in good faith and still failed to fall within the standards.
What about the regulators? Well, since a new-era SEC or the equivalent would be investigating financial statement matters anyway, they could also take on the representation of shareholder claims.
The potential benefits are manifold. Preliminary investigations and early resolutions would screen out marginal cases, so that a simple stock-price wobble would no longer automatically switch on all the machinery of litigation. Investor due diligence, currently unmeasured and unscrutinized before the case reaches the courthouse, would be put to the test. The enormous costs inflicted on U.S. society by the tort law systems could be relieved.
None of the above would ever excuse the inevitable cases of truly culpable behavior, which would still be prosecuted with vigor. What could be achieved, though, is market-testable assurance, in a competitive market of niche and specialized providers, to whom investors and other users could look for real value in response to their needs.
This may or may not be enough for my exigent reader, but it sounds like a big improvement over conditions today.
E-mail: jrpllc@aol.com
correct me if I'm wrong,
持有2005情人節到期購股權，行使價七十元，而新地股價在七十元樓上近八十元，等於付七十元行使購股權而沽出正股，即袋十蚊，我就借貴利都制。
我就估董事們當的時覺得重有得昇，所以遲遲唔行使，結果蘇州過後、、、、
我不大清楚認股證的數量，若大量行使並沽出，明顯會影響市場信心，尤其是在加息陰霾底下，我較為讚成方兄的說法
睇番上文下行, 我覺方生似係暗諷多。邊有可能有錢賺都唔要, 白白睇著d錢走o左去呀~ 依個應該又係typo, 批認股証唔係2005年到期。
卓如兄，做記者唔係你諗咁自由。
睇到未必諗到，諗到未必寫，寫左又未必有得出街，出到街又未必有讀者睇到，睇到又未必有回應，回應左都冇人知啦。
在香港做記者，財經又好，政治又好，唔係以前個個世界。
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